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ABSTRACT  
 
Using data from retail pharmacies, we study the mediating role of trust in the fairness-loyalty 
relationship under different types of interdependence structure between buyers (wholesalers) and 
suppliers (retailers). It is only under symmetric conditions that fairness leads to trust, which in 
turn leads to loyalty, thus establishing a complete mediation effect of trust under such conditions. 
Under conditions of both perceived independence (i.e., lack of interdependence) and asymmetric 
buyer dependence, however, trust does not mediate but fairness directly influences loyalty. The 
implications for research and practice are discussed in the paper. 
 
Key words: Fairness, Loyalty, Trust, Interdependence, Supply chain management, Channels, 
Pharmaceutical industry 
In the supply chain management and marketing channels literatures, fairness, trust, 
interdependence, and loyalty have been identified as key constructs to build, manage, and 
maintain supplier-buyer relationships (cf., Kumar et al. 1995a, 1995b; Kumar 1996; Geyskens et 
al. 1996, 1998; Brown et al. 2006; Brown et al. 2000; Ryu et al. 2007). Despite the theoretically 
and empirically well-established importance of these constructs, however, researchers have not 
incorporated all these constructs in a single study.  For example, as shown in Appendix A, a few 
researchers studied the following relationships between these constructs in the inter-
organizational context: (a) fairness and trust (Kumar et al. 1995a)1; (b) trust and loyalty (Schurr 
and Ozanne 1985); and (c) interdependence and trust (Kumar et al. 1995b, Izquierdo and Cilian 
2004). The extant literature suggests that trust generates outcomes similar to loyalty such as, 
perceived continuity of relationship (Anderson and Weitz 1989), propensity to not leave a 
relationship (Morgan and Hunt 1994), long-term orientation (Ganesan 1994), commitment 
(Morgan and Hunt 1994, Andaleeb 1996, Geyskens, Steenkamp, Scheer and Kumar 1996, 1999), 
anticipated future interactions (Doney and Cannon 1997), sharing internal strategic information 
(Frazier et. al. 2009), buyer satisfaction (Johnston et al. 2004), and relational behaviors (Yilmaz, 
Sezen and Ozdemir 2005). Further, there is evidence, as stated earlier, that fairness creates trust.  
So a key research question is does trust, being a central concept in the channels literature, 
mediate the relationship between fairness and loyalty under different conditions of 
interdependence structure?  
An interesting finding from Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp (1995b, p. 353) in the context 
of automobile dealers and manufacturers relationship was that “high, symmetric interdependence 
                                                          
1 Kumar et al. (1995) created an inclusive relationship quality measure as a dependent variable. Relationship quality was measured as a complex 
second-order construct with several dimensions: affective conflict, manifest conflict, trust in partner's honesty, trust in partner's benevolence, 
commitment, expectation to continuity, and willingness to invest. 
 
 
is no guarantee that trusting relationship will develop,” and “trust and commitment do not 
naturally flourish in asymmetric relationships; if they have to develop, they must be carefully 
cultivated.” They further suggest that in asymmetric relationships trust can be cultivated using 
mechanisms such as fairness. Thus, fairness has a role in creating trust under asymmetric 
conditions, but the findings from Kumar et al. (1995a) suggest that trust is not guaranteed under 
symmetric or asymmetric conditions. What is the role of fairness in creating loyalty when trust is 
moderated by interdependence structure?  Does fairness operate through trust or does it have 
direct effects under different conditions of interdependence? We set to explore these intriguing 
research questions in this study. 
The purpose of this study is three-fold. First, literature suggests that successful supplier-
buyer relationships are determined by the nature of interdependence in the relationship (Heide 
1994), which is indispensable for achieving long-term fruitful strategic partnerships (Mentzer, 
Min and Zacharia 2000). We seek to understand how the mediating role of trust in the fairness-
loyalty relationship is influenced by the moderating role of interdependence between suppliers 
and buyers. 
Second, the relationship between trust and loyalty has been relatively underexplored. 
Firms are increasingly placing greater strategic importance on customer retention and loyalty 
management. While marketing to new customers influences continued growth, several benefits 
also emerge from creating loyalty. First, it is less expensive to retain existing customers than it is 
to attract new customers. Second, repeat customers may be less price sensitive, providing the 
potential for greater profit margins and decreasing the risk of defections due to competitive price 
undercutting. Finally, repeat customers are more likely to purchase a greater volume and variety 
of products. Many studies have explored the relationship between trust and commitment 
(Morgan and Hunt 1994, Ganesan 1994, Geyskens et. al. 1996), but very few studies have 
examined the relationship between trust and loyalty in the buyer-supplier context (Schurr and 
Ozanne 1985).  
Finally, most of the studies in this research stream have been conducted in a single 
context, such as automobile dealers–manufacturer relationship (See Appendix A). In fact, some 
of the findings might be specific to the context as automotive dealers are highly dependent on the 
manufacturer and customarily find it very difficult to switch to another supplier.  This raises the 
question whether those findings are relevant only in the context of powerful suppliers and 
vulnerable buyers or also in other channel contexts. Several authors have criticized the empirical 
research in channels for being fragmented and involving single-context studies (cf. Malhotra, 
Peterson and Kleiser 1999; Reid and Plank 2000). Our goal is to address this issue by testing the 
concept of fairness in a multiple-context setting, the pharmaceutical wholesaler-pharmacy 
retailer channel, where the buyers can source from multiple suppliers. In such a setting, different 
types of interdependence may exist between suppliers and buyers, leading to multiple contexts of 
interdependence—symmetric, asymmetric, and no perceived interdependence.  
We study the aforesaid relationships in the pharmaceutical supply chain, involving 
pharmacies and wholesalers which assure an uninterrupted flow of drugs to patients at optimal 
price, with minimal delays, few shortages, and with little room for error. Wholesalers play a 
critical role in this supply chain as over 80 percent of the prescription drugs flow through the 
wholesalers (HDMA 2009). The wholesaling business has, however, been facing competitive 
pressure owing to some recent trends in the industry, such as mail-order business, third party 
logistics, and consolidation. As a result, the pharmaceutical wholesalers place increased 
importance on the pharmacy customer retention and loyalty, and hence this study. 
We begin by defining the key concepts and developing our hypotheses. A discussion of 
research methodology is followed by a test of our hypotheses. Finally, we conclude with a 
discussion of our findings and implications for practice and future research. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Relationship management is considered ‘the most fragile and tenuous’ component of a supply 
chain management strategy, which may be due to the high importance placed on trusting 
relationships within a supply chain (Handfield and Nichols 1999). As each party in the chain 
needs to have mutual confidence in the actions and capabilities of the other members, developing 
trust is an important factor in buyer-supplier relationships (Johnston et al. 2004).  The 
moderated-mediation model of trust shown in Figure 1 is composed of four constructs described 
below. 
____________________________________ 
Place Figure 1 about here 
____________________________________ 
Fairness 
Research on organizational and social justice has identified two distinct categories of 
fairness: distributive fairness, the fairness of outcomes received, and procedural fairness, the 
fairness of process (Tyler and Lind 1992). Distributive fairness refers to the buyer's perception of 
the fairness of earnings and other outcomes that it receives from its relationship with the 
supplier. Kumar et al. (1995a) defined distributive fairness as a firm's comparison of its actual 
outcomes to those outcomes the firm deems it deserves. Procedural fairness refers to the buyer's 
perception of the fairness of the supplier's procedures and processes in relation to its buyers 
(Kumar et al. 1995a). Value can be gained from assessing both distributive and procedural 
fairness, because they are conceptually distinct, created through different practices, and affected 
by different parties. 
Trust 
 Interorganizational trust operates as a governance mechanism (Bradach and Eccles 1989, 
Heide 1994) that mitigates opportunism in exchange contexts characterized by uncertainty and 
dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). For this study, the definition of trust has two distinct 
dimensions: (1) credibility, which is based on the extent to which the buyer believes that the 
supplier has the required expertise to perform the job effectively and reliably, the cognitive 
dimension of trust and (2) benevolence, which is based on the extent to which the buyer believes 
that the supplier has intentions and motivation beneficial to the buyer when new conditions arise 
for which a commitment is not made (Ganesan 1994, Ganesan and Hess 1997),  the emotional 
dimension.   
Loyalty 
Several different conceptualizations of the loyalty construct containing varying levels of 
complexity have been proposed (Oliver 1999; Dick and Basu 1994; Jacoby and Chestnut 1978). 
Oliver's (1999) comprehensive framework suggested that loyalty, in a relational context, goes 
through four distinct phases: cognitive loyalty, affective loyalty, conative loyalty, and action 
loyalty. Cognitive loyalty is the phase in which the buyer indicates a preference for one supplier 
over its alternatives based on belief in the supplier. Affective loyalty is the phase during which a 
buyer develops a liking toward the supplier based on cumulative satisfying usage occasions. The 
conative loyalty is defined as repeat episodes of intent to rebuy from the supplier and is similar 
to motivation. Action loyalty is when motivated intention in the conative loyalty phase is 
transformed into readiness to act to overcome obstacles that could reduce loyalty to the existing 
supplier, such as switching incentives provided by alternative suppliers, buyer's variety-seeking 
behavior, multi-supplier loyalty, etc.  
A buyer's loyalty with its supplier can move from one type of loyalty to the other in a 
seamless way. Action loyalty, which is the extreme case in the loyalty spectrum, might be very 
difficult to achieve under conditions where the buyer has the ability and opportunity to work 
with multiple suppliers. In addition, it is impossible to identify conditions under which 
"insurmountable unavailability" makes a channel member switch to other suppliers. Given the 
problems with the operationalization of the "action loyalty" construct, we focus on conative 
loyalty, the third phase in the loyalty framework proposed by Oliver (1999). 
Interdependence  
Dependence is arguably the most important construct in understanding distribution 
channel relationships, because channel members, to a varying degree, are dependent on one 
another (Stern et al. 2001). The concept of dependence has been elevated to the dyadic level of 
interdependence with recognition that a firm’s dependence on another is relative to the other 
firm’s dependence on it (Buchanan 1992; Kumar et al. 1995b). In an exchange relationship, 
interdependence describes the sociopolitical structure (Cook and Emerson 1978, Lawler 1992, 
Stern and Reve 1980, Gundlach and Cadotte 1994) and can be classified into four groups: (1) no 
perceived interdependence between the parties, spot markets, (2) the buyer is more dependent on 
the supplier, (3) the supplier is more dependent on the buyer, and (4) both parties are equally 
dependent on each other. Groups 2 and 3 create asymmetric interdependence, and group 4 
represents symmetric interdependence. In this study, the focus is on the symmetry (asymmetry) 
of dependence and not on the magnitude of interdependence.  
 
Fairness-Trust-Loyalty Relationship and Interdependence 
In the consumer research, fairness (distributive and procedural) positively influences 
long-term customer loyalty (Seiders and Berry 1998, Blodgett, Hill and Tax 1997), indicating a 
direct effect of fairness on loyalty. In the inter-organizational research, Kumar et al. (1995a) 
found that fairness influences relationship quality, including commitment and expectations to 
continue. That is, if a supplier treats his/her buyers fairly, this will in the long run lead to a 
positive effect on the buyers’ loyalty to the supplier (Folger 1986).  
 In the inter-organizational literature, fairness (distributive and procedural) was also 
found to increase trust as part of the relationship quality construct (Kumar et al. 1995a). There is 
literature support establishing the theoretical relationship between trust and loyalty (Schurr and 
Ozanne 1985), and outcomes similar to loyalty such as perceived continuity of relationship, 
commitment, long-term orientation, propensity to not leave a relationship and anticipated future 
intentions (See Appendix A). One study has shown the mediating role of trust between fairness 
and loyalty (Jambulingam et al. 2009). Kumar et al. (1995b) noted that mutual interdependence 
between the buyer and the supplier increases trust and commitment, and asymmetric 
interdependence structure decreases them. Further, under conditions of asymmetric 
interdependence, trust seems to increase commitment (Geyskens, Steenkamp, Scheer and Kumar 
1996).  Thus, the levels of trust and commitment seem to be determined by the nature of the 
interdependence structure.  Hence, we contend that the mediating role of trust in the fairness-
loyalty relationship is influenced by a situational contingency—the type of interdependence 
structure between the supplier and the buyer (Figure 1). We first present a global hypothesis and 
then develop specific hypotheses for different types of interdependence.  
H1: The mediating role of trust between fairness and loyalty is influenced by the type of 
interdependence structure between the supplier and the buyer.  
 
Next, we specifically examine how four different states of interdependence may affect 
the fairness-trust-loyalty relationship.  
Symmetric Interdependence.  Symmetric interdependence is a condition where both parties are 
equally dependent on each other. The balance in the relationship provides a stable long-term 
relationship with high levels of trust and cooperation (Dwyer et al. 1987; Anderson and Weitz 
1989). Kumar et al. (1995b) proposed a “bilateral convergence theory,” which suggests that, in 
symmetric interdependence, the interests of the channel participants are convergent or they have 
common goals.  Kumar (1996) shows this symmetric dependence produces effective 
relationships. Symmetric interdependence makes it increasingly undesirable for the suppliers and 
buyers to engage in opportunistic behavior, negative tactics, or coercion, because they have 
much to lose (Kumar et al. 1995b). Such lack of opportunistic behavior fosters higher levels of 
positive effects of procedural and distributive fairness on the trust and commitment in the 
exchange relationship. In a balanced interdependent relationship, both parties must be fair to 
each other which underscores the need for procedural and distributive fairness. In the absence of 
any lingering fear of being exploited, perceived fairness in an exchange relationship promotes 
benevolence- and credibility-based trust between the two parties, which, in turn, leads to loyalty. 
Thus, the two dimensions of trust pave the way for the apparent fairness-loyalty relationships 
under conditions of symmetric interdependence. 
H2: Under conditions of symmetric interdependence, both benevolence-based and 
credibility-based trust will mediate the effect of: 
a. Procedural fairness on buyer’s loyalty keeping the level of distributive fairness 
unchanged. 
b. Distributive fairness on buyer’s loyalty keeping the level of procedural fairness 
unchanged. 
 
Asymmetric Interdependence. Asymmetric interdependence is a condition where one party is 
more dependent on the other party. Williamson (1985) suggests that asymmetric exchanges 
resemble hierarchical relations containing centralized decision structures and unilateral 
governance. Under these conditions, being the vulnerable party is traditionally considered a 
liability. For example, if the buyer is more dependent on the supplier (asymmetric buyer 
dependence) because the supplier controls resources important to the buyer, the supplier can 
bargain aggressively, influencing the buyer’s strategic decisions (El-Ansary and Stern 1972; 
Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). The supplier under this condition has been assumed to use its 
influence to achieve internal goals at the buyer’s expense; the relationship often has been 
characterized as involving a high degree of dissatisfaction (Gaski 1984; Reve and Stern 1979; 
Buchanan 1992). A buyer under this condition often must rely on the powerful supplier’s sense 
of fairness and restraint to avoid mistreatment (Anderson and Weitz 1992; Heide and John 
1988). Kumar (1996) defines these asymmetric interdependence situations as either “hostages” 
meaning that they are more dependent on the other party or “drunk with power” if the other party 
is more dependent on them. 
 Under such conditions of a lop-sided asymmetric buyer dependence relationship, the 
weaker party fears opportunistic behavior by the more powerful party or a greater probability of 
being taken advantage. The resultant fear is so strong and irrational that it dampens the effects of 
any procedural or distributive fairness in provoking or cultivating trust in the relationship. Kumar 
et al. (1995b) have shown that increasing interdependence asymmetry decreases the trust in the 
relationship. Geyskens et al. (1998), conducting a meta-analysis of studies in marketing channel 
relationships, have shown that interdependence asymmetry appears to have a small negative 
effect on trust. Anderson and Weitz (1989) offered evidence that channel relationships, 
characterized by power asymmetry, generate lower trust than those characterized by symmetry. 
The buyer, however, might continue to do business with the supplier (i.e., show loyalty) simply 
because they become more sensitive to fairness when trust is low and s/he perceives procedural 
and distributive fairness in the supplier’s dealings, but there it is less likely that fairness would 
pave the way for either benevolence- or credibility-based trust in this relationship. Hence, it is 
hypothesized that distributive and procedural fairness will have direct impact on loyalty and will 
not be mediated by trust.  
H3: Under conditions of asymmetric interdependence, where the buyer is more 
dependent on the supplier, neither benevolence-based trust nor credibility-based trust 
will mediate the effect of  
a. Procedural fairness on buyer’s loyalty keeping the level of distributive fairness 
unchanged. 
b. Distributive fairness on buyer’s loyalty keeping the level of procedural fairness 
unchanged. 
 
Similarly, when the buyer perceives the supplier to be more dependent on him/her 
(asymmetric supplier dependence), the buyer can exercise influence to get better delivery terms. 
As explained above, such a relationship would also be marked by high fear of opportunistic 
behavior, which, in turn, would deter the development of trust between the two parties. Since the 
buyer commands more influence in the relationship, s/he might not feel the necessity to develop 
a trusting relationship with the supplier.   Further, since the supplier is more dependent on the 
buyer, the former would demonstrate procedural fairness and equitable distribution of benefits in 
order to have continued business from the buyer. In the absence of a trusting relationship, any 
repeat business would largely be due procedural and/or distributive fairness on part of the 
supplier, and hence there is no question of either dimension of trust mediating the fairness-
loyalty relationships. 
H4: Under conditions of asymmetric interdependence, where the supplier is more 
dependent on the buyer, neither benevolence-based trust nor credibility-based trust will 
mediate the effect of  
a. Procedural fairness on buyer’s loyalty keeping the level of distributive fairness 
unchanged. 
b. Distributive fairness on buyer’s loyalty keeping the level of procedural fairness 
unchanged. 
 
 
No Perceived Interdependence.  Lack of interdependence, or independence, in an exchange 
relationship is when both parties perceive that they do not depend on each other. This can happen 
when the relationship resembles a spot market or when it is relatively new. When the two parties 
generally do not feel dependent on each other, the relationship might be more competitive than 
cooperative in nature (Molm et al. 2006).  Evidently, given the lack of cooperative behavior, the 
buyer may perceive a lower probability of supplier engaging in actions that are beneficial to the 
buyer; that is lack of perceived trust in the relationship. 
 Trust is most widely recognized as the social norm for managing and coordinating 
interorganizational exchange (Morgan and Hunt 1994; Jap 2001). Sheppard and Sherman (1998) 
contend that trust is the acceptance of risks associated with interdependence inherent in each 
relationship. In the case of no perceived interdependence, the resultant lack of cooperative 
behavior between the buyer and supplier may hamper any possibility of fairness leading to trust.  
No matter how fair the procedures (procedural fairness), or how equitable the supplier sharing of 
the benefits with the buyer (distributive fairness), the non-cooperative behavior between supply 
chain partners would inhibit a trusting relationship that might have otherwise spawned based on 
the perceived fairness. It is also possible that due to non-cooperative behavior, arising out of no 
perceived interdependence, the supply chain partners may not feel that the other party respects 
and values their efforts, and is thus likely to treat them inequitably (Kickul et al. 2005). Under 
such perceived fears of inequity, any amount of fairness is unlikely to lead to trust. The buyer, 
however, might be willing to continue to transact business with the supplier (i.e., show loyalty) 
based on perceived procedural and/or distributive fairness in supplier’s dealings. Thus, neither 
dimension of trust would be expected to mediate the fairness-loyalty relationships under 
conditions of no perceived interdependence. Hence, 
H5: Under conditions of no perceived interdependence between the buyer and the 
supplier, neither benevolence-based nor credibility-based trust will mediate the 
effect of: 
a. Procedural fairness on buyer’s loyalty keeping the level of distributive fairness 
unchanged. 
b. Distributive fairness on buyer’s loyalty keeping the level of procedural fairness 
unchanged. 
 
METHOD 
 
Sample and Data Collection 
 
The literature review indicated that most of the studies done in this area were in the 
automobile industry whereby the automotive dealers evaluated their suppliers. Lusch and Brown 
(1996) study, however, was in the context of the wholesaler/distributor and supplier. The present 
study is focused on the pharmaceutical supply chain in the health care industry. The sample in 
this study was drawn from the retail pharmaceutical industry that deals with pharmaceutical 
wholesalers, who play a critical role in the distribution of prescription products. About 80 
percent of the pharmaceutical products flow through the wholesalers. The sample frame for the 
study was a list of retail pharmacies obtained from state departments of licensing and regulation. 
Because it is mandatory that all pharmacies in each state register and obtain a license to operate, 
this list was the most comprehensive and accurate and included all types of pharmacies (e.g., 
independent, chain, food and drug combination stores, etc.).  
Telephone prescreening was conducted to: (a) identify the owner/manager, (b) seek prior 
commitment to participate in the mail survey, (c) identify the supplier that served as the referent 
for that pharmacy’s response, and (d) determine how knowledgeable and involved the 
prospective respondent was with respect to the supplier. Most of the pharmacies had multiple 
suppliers of pharmaceutical products. The identification of the referent supplier on which the 
pharmacy answered the questionnaire was done randomly following a procedure similar to the 
Kish selection grid (Kish 1965). This procedure was used to avoid pharmacies consistently 
selecting either their best or their worst supplier and to ensure variance on the type of supplier 
evaluated. Each line (row) of the grid was generated by a computerized random number 
generator (number between 1 and 5) as each pharmacy tended to name between 2 and 5 
suppliers.  Each line was used for only one pharmacy contact; after a pharmacy was contacted, 
the line of the grid was used to assign a referent supplier and that line was never used again for 
any other pharmacies. If a pharmacy had only one supplier, then that supplier was used as the 
referent supplier. 
Following prescreening, pretested surveys with personalized cover letters were mailed to 
400 pharmacies. Follow-up letters were not sent. Questionnaires were received back from 156 
pharmacies. After elimination of nine questionnaires, because of incomplete data, the final 
sample consisted of 147 pharmacies or a completed response rate of 37 percent. Using the 
Armstrong and Overton (1977) procedure, the “non-response” bias was evaluated by comparing 
the early respondents with late respondents for all constructs considered in this study. Since no 
significant differences were found at the 0.05 level of significance, the potential of “non-
response” bias is mitigated. In addition, questions measuring the respondent's degree of personal 
involvement (pharmacy's dealings with this wholesaler) and knowledgeability (in general about 
the pharmacy's dealings with this wholesaler) were included in the survey. The average levels of 
involvement and knowledgeability measured on a seven-point scale were 6.35 and 6.56 
respectively, indicating that the respondents were very involved and knowledgeable about the 
suppliers. 
In addition, we also compared the levels of involvement and knowledgeability between 
early and late respondents, which did not reflect any significant statistical differences using the t-
tests. The early and late respondents were also compared on variables such as number of 
suppliers used, purchase volume, length of the relationship, and average annual inventory 
turnover, all of which showed non-significant differences (t values ranged from 0.686 to 1.572, 
which are non-significant at the .05 level). 
Measure Development 
 
Whenever possible, we attempted to use multi-item measures that had been utilized in 
previous studies. Where a new scale had to be developed, we were guided initially by the 
construct definitions and the scales utilized in organizational research. The resulting measures 
and scales were then modified after face-to-face and telephone interviews with pharmacy 
managers (see Appendix B). 
Distributive fairness was assessed using five items developed by Kumar et al. (1995a) 
and Yilmaz et al. (2004) but was modified based on interviews with retail pharmacies. The items 
require the pharmacy managers to assess, relative to several factors, the fairness of outcomes and 
earnings from carrying the wholesaler's line. Procedural fairness items were adapted for this 
study from measures previously utilized by Kumar et al. (1995a). One item measuring each of 
the six principles of bilateral communication, impartiality, refutability, explanation, 
knowledgeability, and courtesy created the procedural fairness scale.  
Trust was defined as the perceived credibility and benevolence of a target (supplier) of 
trust (Ganesan 1994; Kumar et al. 1995a; Geyskens et. al. 1998). Credibility and benevolence are 
considered two dimensions of trust. Past studies have indicated that the two dimensions are 
correlated. Thus, a two-dimensional construct of trust was developed, and the items were 
rendered from past studies, such as Ganesan (1994) and Doney and Cannon (1997). The buyer's 
loyalty scale was developed based on the definition of conative loyalty, which is characterized 
by repeat episodes of intent to rebuy from the supplier and is similar to motivation (Oliver 1999). 
Researchers in the past have used two approaches to measure interdependence (Kim and 
Hsieh 2003). One approach categorizes supplier-distributor dependence as either low or high and 
creates a 2 x 2 matrix (Buchanan 1992, Kumar et al. 1995b). The other approach identifies and 
measures two aspects of interdependence: magnitude and asymmetry (Gundlach and Cadotte 
1994; Jap and Ganesan 2000; Kumar et al. 1995b; Lusch and Brown 1996). Apparently, there are 
potential trade-offs with both approaches of measurement. In a comparative review of the two 
main approaches generally used to measure interdependence—categorical approach and 
dimensional approach—Kim and Hsieh (2003) conclude that both approaches have advantages 
and limitations, and as such none is superior to the other. The categorical approach, as used in 
this study, “is more parsimonious and less burdensome than is the dimensional approach, [and] it 
can be an efficient way of collecting data” (p.102). Among its limitations, they point out that it 
reduces a multipoint scale to a two-point scale and cannot handle the degree of asymmetry.  The 
dimensional approach, however, “cannot determine which party contributes more to the 
magnitude of the interdependence and, consequently, to an outcome variable” (Buchanan 1992 in 
Kim and Hsieh 2003, p. 103). 
For the aforesaid reasons and the added complexity due to two mediator variables and 
two antecedents, we chose to focus on the four types of interdependence: (i) mutual (equal) 
interdependence, (ii) buyer-dominated interdependence, (iii) supplier-dominated 
interdependence, and (iv) lack of perceived interdependence. Our measure was similar to, but not 
the same as, Buchanan (1992). Buchanan measured dependence as the ability to replace the other 
supplier. We measured the extent of interdependence directly by asking the buyers to choose 
from among four descriptions of their relationship with the supplier: (1) the buyer is more 
dependent on the supplier, (2) the supplier is more dependent on the buyer, (3) they are equally 
dependent on each other, and (4) they are not dependent on each other (see Appendix B for 
details on this measure and others). The overall sample was split into four groups, based on the 
buyer’s response to this above mentioned question, for testing the study hypotheses. In our 
assessment, the sub-group approach adopted in the study helps parcel out the intricate mediating 
effects of the two dimensions of trust in the procedural fairness-loyalty and distributive fairness-
loyalty relationships under four different conditions of interdependence.  
Measurement Analysis 
We evaluated the validity and reliability of the study constructs as follows. First, a 
confirmatory factor analysis was performed using AMOS 6.0 on three alternative measurement 
models: a) The baseline Independence model whereby the latent variables are assumed to be 
uncorrelated, b) The three latent variable (correlated) model with one dimension each of the 
Fairness and Trust constructs, and Loyalty as the third variable, and c) The five-variable 
(correlated) model with two dimensions each of the Fairness and Trust constructs. Each latent 
variable had multiple indicators or observed variables. The improvement in fit (i.e., ratio of chi-
square to degrees of freedom or CMIN/DF) was used to compare the three models. The fit 
indices (CMIN/DF) were 14.22, 5.22 and 4.61 respectively, which show that the third model is 
the most efficient in accounting for the data. Further, the third model also indicates a reasonable 
fit as its ratio is below 5 (Hair et al. 2006).  The Normed Fit Index (NFI) was also the highest for 
the third model. These results support our conceptualization that both trust and fairness have two 
dimensions each. 
The standardized regression weights (a.k.a. factor loadings or path coefficients) ranged 
between 0.59 and 0.91 with one exception. The third item for procedural fairness had a weight of 
0.38 which was marginally below the 0.4 threshold commonly considered meaningful in factor-
analytic investigations (Ford et al. 1986 in Geyskens et al. 1996). The model fit for the original 
model was reasonable, but it improved (CFI= 0.89, TLI=0.85, NFI=0.86) as the items with lower 
weights were dropped. The RMSEA, however, continued to be on the higher side (= 0.13). We 
verified the internal consistency of the scales using Cronbach’s Alpha. The internal consistency 
was 0.88 for procedural fairness, 0.86 for distributive fairness, 0.94 for trust (credibility), and 
0.87 for trust (benevolence). The composite reliability was also very high for all of the above 
scales and ranged between 0.90-0.96, with the exception of loyalty (=0.82) which too is above 
the threshold of 0.8. Such high reliability estimates suggest that the indicators measure the same 
latent constructs, and hence are reliable indicators. The convergent validity of the constructs was 
tested using the average variance extracted (AVE), which ranged between 0.67-0.78 and much 
exceeds the minimum threshold of 0.50. Hence, the amount of variance captured by each latent 
construct is much higher compared to the variance due to random measurement error.  
To assess the discriminant validity, we used the Fornell-Larcker test which ensures that a 
latent variable explains more variance of its own indicators than the variance of other latent 
variables. The test is conducted by comparing the square root of the AVE to the correlations 
between the latent variable and all other latent variable constructs. As seen in Table 1, the square 
root of the AVE for each latent variable (number in bold along the diagonal of the matrix) is 
greater than all the other correlations in the same rows and columns for that AVE.  
____________________________________ 
Place Table 1 about here 
____________________________________ 
Purchase volume (percentage of total annual dollar purchase from this particular 
wholesaler) was used as a control variable.  The summary statistics for the measures are reported 
in Table 1. All of the independent and dependent variables are significantly intercorrelated at p < 
0.01. The control variable, purchase volume, is significantly correlated at p < 0.05 with the 
ultimate outcome variable, buyer loyalty. Purchase volume is also significantly correlated at p < 
0.05 with trust (benevolence), which serves as a mediating variable, as a penultimate outcome 
variable. 
RESULTS 
 
The traditional Sobel test is generally used to decipher the effect of one mediator at a 
time between an independent variable and the dependent variable, but it does not allow for any 
covariates in the model. The Sobel Z statistic based on the Multiple Mediation procedure of 
Preacher and Hayes (2008), however, can be obtained using bootstrapping but again the model 
allows for only one independent variable at a time and no covariates. Using the Baron and Kenny 
procedure and Structural Equation Modeling, we were able to test for the mediation effects of the 
two dimensions of trust (credibility_trust and benelolence_trust) between two independent 
variables (procedural and distributive fairness) and the dependent variable (loyalty) 
simultaneously, in the presence of a covariate (purchase volume). 
The overall hypothesis (H1) regarding the moderating influence of interdependence that 
the mediating role of trust would vary under four conditions of interdependence was first tested 
using the “Multiple-Group Analysis” in AMOS 6.0. The results (Overall Chi-square = 20.457, df 
= 15, p = 0.155) supported our overall contention that the mediating role of trust differs in the 
four groups, and that interdependence moderates the nature of fairness-trust-loyalty relationships. 
A nonsignificant p value suggests that we fail to reject the hypothesis that the unconstrained 
model of differences across groups fits the data. Hence, interdependence does influence the 
nature of fairness-trust-loyalty relationship in that the four groups pertaining to as many 
conditions of interdependence are indeed different.  
 
To further test the varying mediating role of trust under different conditions of 
interdependence represented by four subgroups, Hypotheses H2-H5 were tested using regression 
models as the limited subgroup size prohibited further use of SEM.  We followed the Baron and 
Kenny (1986) procedure to test for the mediation effects of trust under different conditions of 
interdependence as follows. First, we ran a regression with loyalty as the dependent variable and 
purchase volume as the independent (control) variable. Second, we estimated a direct model 
without any mediation variables (trust—credibility and trust—benevolence) and estimated direct 
effects of the two dimensions of fairness on loyalty after controlling for the purchase volume. 
We then compared the direct effects with the corresponding coefficients from a mediating model 
that included the two types of trust, credibility and benevolence, as the mediating variables. A 
full mediation was indicated if the following conditions were met: (1) the direct effects model 
produced a significant effect on a given outcome (procedural fairness and distributive fairness on 
loyalty), (2) the corresponding direct effect was reduced to non-significance after inclusion of the 
mediating variables, and (3) the mediators had a significant effect on the focal outcome (i.e., 
trust credibility and trust benevolence on loyalty). Mediation was not indicated when the direct 
effects remain virtually unchanged with the introduction of the mediating variables as in 
condition 2. Finally, partial mediation was indicated if the direct effects were reduced but did not 
become non-significant.  
 To test Hypotheses H2-H5, we first divided the overall sample into subgroups based on 
the four interdependence categories as described earlier under the Measure Development section. 
We were able to use only three of the four subgroups: symmetric interdependence (our firm and 
the wholesaler are equally dependent on each other, N = 63); asymmetric buyer dependence (our 
firm is more dependent on this wholesaler, N = 45); and no perceived interdependence (our firm 
is not dependent on this wholesaler, and this wholesaler is not dependent on our firm, N = 27) to 
test the hypotheses. Given the nature of the industry under study, the asymmetric supplier 
dependence group (this wholesaler is more dependent on our firm) turned out to be less prevalent 
with N = 12, and was dropped from further analysis due to insufficient sample size.  
Under conditions of symmetric interdependence, when the buyer and supplier are equally 
dependent on each other, both procedural and distributive fairness have a direct significant effect 
(beta = 0.346 at p < 0.01, and beta = 0.236 at p < 0.05, respectively) on loyalty, as shown in 
Table 2. Further, the relationship is completely mediated by both dimensions of trust—credibility 
and benevolence—as the two fairness coefficients become non-significant (beta = 0.017 and 
0.066, respectively). Thus, Hypotheses H2a and H2b are supported. 
____________________________________ 
Place Table 2 about here 
____________________________________ 
 
 Under conditions of asymmetric interdependence, when the buyer is more dependent on 
the supplier, only procedural fairness has a significant direct effect (beta = 0.719, p < 0.001) on 
loyalty. When trust is introduced in the equation, the results shown in Table 3 indicate that the 
procedural fairness coefficient becomes less significant (beta = 0.435, p < 0.05), but both trust 
coefficients are non-significant. Thus, trust does not seem to mediate the fairness-loyalty 
relationship when the buyer is more dependent on the supplier, and hence H3a and H3b are 
supported. As mentioned above, H4a and H4b couldn’t be tested owing a small number of 
observations in that subgroup. 
____________________________________ 
Place Table 3 about here 
____________________________________ 
The results shown in Table 4 suggest that in an exchange relationship with no perceived 
interdependence, trust does not mediate the fairness-loyalty relationship, as expected. Thus, the 
proposed H5a and H5b are supported. It is important to note that both procedural and distributive 
fairness have a significant direct effect (beta = 0.403 and 0.380, respectively; both are significant 
at p < 0.05) on buyer loyalty when there is no perceived interdependence between buyer and 
supplier.  
____________________________________ 
Place Table 4 about here 
____________________________________ 
 
DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Theoretical Implications 
 
Interdependence was found to be a very important construct in supplier-buyer 
relationships. We found that varying types of interdependence (i.e., symmetric interdependence, 
asymmetric buyer dependence, and no perceived interdependence) have differential impacts on 
the nature of fairness-trust-loyalty relationships. Under conditions of symmetric dependence, 
trust completely mediates the relationship between fairness and loyalty. We established that, in 
symmetric (balanced) relationships, both distributive and procedural fairness facilitate the 
development of benevolence-based and credibility-based trust which, in turn, engenders loyalty. 
Under symmetric interdependence structure when the power is balanced, trust would have 
developed well. A balanced relationship helps alleviate the fear that one’s supply chain partner 
will engage in any irrational, opportunistic behavior, and, thus, fosters a trusting relationship 
based on perceived fairness. Under such conditions, trust can lead even highly developed firms 
to desire to maintain the relationship (Geyskens et al. 1996).  So signaling fairness under 
conditions of symmetric interdependence generates trust, which, in turn, creates loyalty. It may 
be noted that this finding is contrary to that of Kumar et al. (1995b), who observed that even in 
high symmetric interdependence conditions there was no guarantee that a trusting, committed 
relationship would develop.  
In the case of asymmetric buyer dependence when the buyer perceives itself to be more 
dependent on the wholesaler, the supplier can bargain aggressively given its lack of offsetting 
dependence. Such a relationship could be marked by a high degree of opportunistic behavior, 
which would deter the development of trust between the two parties. Since the supplier enjoins 
more influence in the relationship, s/he might not feel the necessity to develop a trusting 
relationship with the buyer. The asymmetric nature of the relationship dampens the development 
of adequate trust, thus leading to reliance on other mechanisms for developing loyalty.  
The vulnerable retailers, unable to protect themselves from the wholesaler’s opportunism, 
would not develop trust in the relationship (Heide and John 1988). Under asymmetric conditions 
trust may be low (Anderson and Weitz 1989, Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987, Frazier, Gill and Kale 
1989, Stern and Reve 1980). Geyskens et. al 1996 observed that when “trust is absent, 
developing affective commitment is highly unlikely” (p. 314). Kumar et al. (1995b) noted that 
“trust and commitment do not naturally flourish in asymmetric relationships; if they are to 
develop, they must be carefully cultivated” (p. 353). Our study concurs with these earlier 
findings suggesting that under asymmetric interdependence structure, trust cannot create loyalty 
(similar to affective commitment) but fairness can directly impact loyalty. So in asymmetric 
relationships, signaling fairness by the powerful wholesaler could generate loyalty even when the 
trust is low or absent in the relationship. Since the buyer is more dependent on the supplier, the 
latter could at least demonstrate procedural fairness in order to have continued business from the 
buyer. In the absence of a trusting relationship, the likelihood of repeat business could be 
improved by improving the perception of procedural fairness on part of the supplier, and hence 
either dimension of trust may not mediate the fairness-loyalty relationships.  
Under conditions of no perceived interdependence, trust (credibility and benevolence) 
does not mediate the relationship between fairness and loyalty. This is a condition that could 
happen either early in a relationship or in a spot market situation. When supply chain partners do 
not perceive interdependence, a trusting relationship based on credibility and benevolence does 
not seem to develop because of the possible fear of opportunistic behavior or because the 
relationship is premature. The buyer, however, might be willing to continue to transact business 
with the supplier (i.e., show loyalty) if s/he perceives procedural and/or distributive fairness in 
supplier’s dealings. Thus, if firms try to develop loyalty with their partners while remaining 
independent, fairness seems indispensable in the relationship.  
Managerial Implications 
Given the increasing pressures on the cost of the health care system, pharmaceutical 
companies are increasingly finding ways to becoming more efficient. They are also 
experimenting direct distribution strategies to pharmacies using third party logistics companies, 
such as UPS. If such practices become a common place, then the role of wholesalers will 
diminish or eventually disappear. This challenge poses more a reason for the wholesaler to build 
trusting relationships and loyalty with the pharmacies, which has strategic advantage for the 
pharmaceutical wholesalers. First, the more loyal pharmacy customers the wholesalers have, the 
more clout they would have as the pharmaceutical manufacturers would hesitate to bypass the 
wholesalers thus providing power balance to the wholesalers. Second, it is less costly to retain a 
customer than to acquire a new one. Appropriate deployment of procedural fairness and 
distributive fairness is necessary to build trust and eventually loyalty with the pharmacies. The 
wholesaler that does a superior job in creating a competitive advantage leveraging fairness to 
engender trust might get to benefit in recruiting more pharmacies to their loyalty programs. 
Under conditions of symmetric interdependence, we noted that as managers at the 
supplier’s end demonstrate fairness—procedural and distributive—they are able to cultivate a 
trusting relationship with the buyers, which in turn leads to buyer loyalty. A straight forward 
implication of this finding in the pharmaceutical supply chain is that pharmaceutical wholesalers 
should clearly communicate and set expectations to the pharmacy on how they can help on 
various business processes that will contribute to the pharmacy’s success (Doucette and 
Jambulingam 1998). Specifically, the wholesaler could offer to train and educate pharmacy 
managers on how to a) improve clinical services and monitor drug interactions, b) manage third 
party prescription benefit contracts, c) deploy patient compliance and reminder solutions. In 
addition, the wholesaler should examine the local market conditions of the pharmacy and help 
them identify appropriate service offerings, such as long-term care, home health care, etc. Since 
the pharmacy managers can easily observe, monitor, and track the above mentioned business 
processes, it would help develop trust in the relationship leading to their loyalty to the 
wholesaler. Additionally, the wholesalers should display intentions beneficial to the pharmacy. 
For example, how they could make better margins on generic drugs. Such actions signal to the 
pharmacies that the wholesalers care about the pharmacy’s business and are willing to put the 
pharmacy needs above their own.  
Under conditions of perceived independence or asymmetric buyer-dependence, a trusting 
relationship between supply chain partners may not develop.  In asymmetric buyer-dependence 
condition, the buyer shows repeat behavior based on the supplier’s fair procedures. Thus, 
managers at the supplier’s end should effectively develop procedural fairness and signal their 
counterparts at the buyer’s end. Procedural fairness on part of the wholesalers could be 
demonstrated by instituting business processes that can be easily observed, monitored and 
tracked by the pharmacies. In the case of early relationships, where there is no perceived 
interdependence yet, suppliers should also demonstrate equitable division of benefits with their 
buyers to espouse loyalty in their buyers.  
The above findings, when viewed from the opposite angle, could be used to train the 
wholesalers to signal to the pharmacies that they are equally dependent on them for their own 
success. Such signaling on part of the wholesalers would help the pharmacy managers to 
perceive a mutually dependent relationship. Managing the perception is germane to generating 
trust, which in turn engenders loyalty.   
The results have significant applications to other channel contexts wherever buyers can 
exercise choice in selecting suppliers. It is important to note that trust plays a critical role in 
highly interdependent relationships. Building trust becomes imperative in symmetric 
relationships. In asymmetric buyer-dependent relationships, supplier’s procedural fairness plays 
an important role in garnering buyer loyalty. It may be that when the buyers are more dependent 
on their suppliers, the suppliers may not see the need to engage in fair distribution of benefits 
since the buyers would continue to buy out of necessity. In early relationships, however, both 
forms of fairness—procedural and distributive—help engender loyalty. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
This study is not free from limitations, which could serve as a fertile ground for future 
research. First, due to a relatively powerful position of the wholesalers in this pharmaceutical 
wholesaler-buyer relationship, the asymmetric seller dependence condition could not be 
investigated. Other channel or supply chain relationships consisting of more powerful buyers 
should be investigated to see how fairness and trust operate under an asymmetric supplier 
dependency situation. Second, the interdependence measure used in the study is a categorical 
one, which we thought to be appropriate for the study as it allowed us to parcel out the mediating 
effects under different conditions of interdependence. It, however, suffers from the limitation of 
not being able to assess the degree of symmetry or asymmetry under each condition. The 
dimensional approach used in some earlier studies has limitations too. Thus, future research 
should consider developing some alternatives, such as the response surface approach of Kim and 
Hsieh (2003). 
Given the important role that fairness plays in generating buyer loyalty in the cases of 
perceived independence between buyers and suppliers and asymmetric buyer dependence, future 
research opportunities exist for exploring the antecedents to distributive and procedural fairness. 
Future research may also benefit from studying the moderating influence of variables, such as 
conflict and dissatisfaction, in the fairness-trust-loyalty relationship under different conditions of 
interdependence. Future research in this area should further investigate the role of fairness in 
other channel contexts.  
Conclusions 
The varying conditions of interdependence examined in the study help us better 
understand the mediating role of trust in the fairness-loyalty relationship. It is only under 
symmetric conditions that fairness leads to trust, which in turn leads to a loyal, longer lasting 
buyer-supplier relationship. Under conditions of perceived independence or asymmetric buyer 
dependence, the lack of cooperative behavior and related fear of irrational, opportunistic 
behavior hinder the growth of a trusting relationship. In such cases, the buyer’s repeat buying 
behavior is simply founded on the procedural and distributive fairness of the supplier. 
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APPENDIX A 
Study Independent Variable  Dependent variable Context Findings 
Schurr and 
Ozanne 1985 
Trust (+) Attitude toward loyalty MBA students in a simulated buyer-
seller context 
Supported 
Anderson and 
Weitz 1989 
Trust (+) Perceived continuity of 
relationship 
Independent sales agents and their 
manufacturers 
Relationship Supported 
Ganesan 1994 Trust –credibility (+) 
Trust – benevolence (+) 
Long-Term Orientation 
(LTO) 
Retail buyers and their vendors of 
six regional department stores 
Only trust –credibility and 
LTO relationship 
supported 
Morgan and 
Hunt  1994 
Trust(-) 
Trust (+) 
Propensity to leave 
Commitment  
Automobile tire retailers that are 
members of national tire dealers and 
retreaders association (NTDRA) 
Both Relationships 
Supported 
Kumar, Scheer 
and Steenkamp 
1995a 
Distributive Fairness (+) 
Procedural Fairness (+) 
Relationship quality 
(complex measure 
including trust) 
Automotive dealers evaluating 
manufacturers 
Both relationships 
supported 
Kumar, Scheer 
and Steenkamp 
1995b 
Total Interdependence (+) 
Interdependence asymmetry (-) 
Trust Automobile dealers Both relationships 
supported 
Geyskens, 
Steenkamp, 
Scheer and 
Kumar 1996 
Total Interdependence (+) 
 
Affective commitment 
Calculative commitment 
Automobile dealers in US and 
Netherlands 
All relationships except 
relationship between 
interdependence 
asymmetry and attitudinal 
commitment were 
supported 
Interdependence asymmetry (-) Attitudinal commitment 
Interdependence asymmetry (+) Calculative commitment 
Trust(+) Attitudinal commitment 
Trust(-) Calculative commitment 
Interdependence asymmetry x 
Trust (+) 
Attitudinal commitment 
Andaleeb 1996 Trust (+) Commitment Simulated buyer, supplier 
relationship with MBA students 
Supported 
Lusch and 
Brown 1996 
Bilateral dependence (+) 
Wholesaler/distributor 
dominated dependence (+) 
Supplier dominated 
dependence (-) 
Long Term Orientation 
of the 
wholesaler/distributor 
 
Wholesaler -distributors evaluating 
their suppliers 
Only the relationship 
between 
wholesaler/distributor 
dominated dependence and 
LTO was supported 
Doney and 
Cannon 1997 
Trust (+) 
 
Anticipated future 
interactions 
Industrial manufacturing firms in 
SIC 30 – 37 evaluating their 
suppliers 
Supported 
Geyskens, 
Steenkamp, 
and Kumar 
1998 
Trust (+) Long Term Orientation Meta-analysis  Supported 
Geyskens, 
Steenkamp, 
and Kumar 
1999 
Trust (+) Commitment Meta-analysis  Supported 
Kim and Hsieh 
2003 
Interdependence type  
(Categorical) 
Interdependence – magnitude 
and asymmetry  
Distributor Commitment Industrial Distributors – SIC 5084 – 
industrial machinery/equipment  
and SIC 5085 industrial supplies 
Distributor commitment 
was high for high mutual 
dependence category 
compared to other three 
categories of asymmetric 
and low dependence.  
Izquierdo and 
Cilian 2004 
Magnitude of Interdependence 
(+) 
Trust 
 
Supplier-manufacturer in the 
automotive industry 
Supported 
Yilmaz, Sezen 
and Ozdemir 
2005 
Trust Relational behaviors Manufacturer -Automobile 
dealership in Turkey 
Supported 
 
APPENDIX B 
Measures  
 
Distributive Fairness: α = 0.86 
(7-point Likert scale, "Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree") 
1. This wholesaler provides us fair gross margins on the purchases made from them. 
2. This wholesaler provides us a fair share of the earnings for the effort we have made to support their product 
lines. 
3. This wholesaler provides us fair prices compared to other pharmacies in our industry. 
4. This wholesaler provides us fair service levels for the investment we have made to support their product lines. 
 
Procedural Fairness: α = 0.88 
(7-point Likert scale, "Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree") 
1. This wholesaler promotes bilateral communication with the pharmacies. 
2. This wholesaler does not differentiate but rather treats all pharmacies similarly. 
3. This wholesaler sometimes alters its policies in response to a pharmacy's objections. 
4. This wholesaler provides valid reasons for any changes in their policies affecting the pharmacies. 
5. This wholesaler makes great effort to learn local market conditions under which our pharmacies operate. 
6. This wholesaler treats the pharmacies with respect. 
 
Trust (Credibility): α = 0.94 
(7-point Likert scale, "Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree") 
1. The wholesaler keeps promises it makes to our pharmacy. 
2. This wholesaler is reliable. 
3. If problems arise, this wholesaler is honest about the problems. 
4. This wholesaler has been consistent in terms of their policies. 
5. We are confident in the information that this wholesaler provides us. 
6. Whenever this wholesaler gives our pharmacy advice on our business operations, we know that they are sharing 
their best judgment. 
 
Trust (Benevolence): α = 0.87 
(7-point Likert scale, "Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree") 
1. This wholesaler is genuinely concerned that our pharmacy achieves its goals. 
2. When making important decisions, this wholesaler considers our welfare before its own. 
3. This wholesaler considers our interests when problems arise. 
4. This wholesaler has gone out of its way  to help us. 
5. This wholesaler has made sacrifices for us in the past. 
 
Buyer Loyalty: α = not applicable 
(7-point Likert scale, "Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree") 
1. We will not switch from this wholesaler at any cost.  
2. We will shift more business to this wholesaler. 
 
Interdependence 
Please check the one statement below that best describes your relationship with your wholesaler. 
1. Our firm is more dependent on the wholesaler. 
2. This wholesaler is more dependent on our firm. 
3. Our firm and the wholesaler are equally dependent on each other. 
4. Our firm is not dependent on this wholesaler, and this wholesaler is not dependent on our firm. 
 
Purchase Volume 
What percentage of your total annual dollar purchase of prescription drugs do you obtain from this particular 
wholesaler?  _____% 
TABLE 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations 
 
        Correlations  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Variables    Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6         
 
1. Buyer Loyalty   4.45 1.19 0.83 0.370 0.549 0.556 0.534 0.186 
2. Distributive Fairness  5.17 1.07   0.83 0.714 0.584 0.612 0.072  
3. Procedural Fairness  4.42 1.12   0.83 0.780 0.694 0.025 
4. Trust (Credibility)   4.85 1.47  0.89 0.742 0.024 
5. Trust (Benevolence)  4.21 1.29     0.82 0.133 
6. Purchase Volume            84.47   25.34           * 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: All correlation coefficients > 0.36 are significant at p < 0.01, whereas correlation coefficients > 0.13 are 
significant at p < 0.05.  
Numbers along the diagonal in bold are the square root values of the AVE for that latent variable. 
*Purchase volume is an objective measure 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Mediating Role of Trust under the Symmetric Interdependence Condition 
Dependent variable: Loyalty 
Variables   Model 1   Model 2  Model 3 
Purchase Volume    .364***    .393****       .352*** 
Procedural Fairness           .346***              .017    
Distributive Fairness        .236**   .066  
Trust (Credibility)1             .472*** 
Trust (Benevolence) 1            .311** 
 
Adjusted R-Square    .119         .295        .365 
F Statistic    9.49***   9.79****    8.25****  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
**** p < .001, *** p < .01, ** p < .05 
Note: N = 63. Directional hypotheses were tested using a one-tailed t-test. 
1Mediating variable. 
  
 
 
Table 3 
Mediating Role of Trust under the Asymmetric Buyer Dependence Condition 
Dependent variable: Loyalty 
 
Variables   Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 
Purchase Volume    .137    .044      .001 
Procedural Fairness        .719****     .435** 
Distributive Fairness        .140      .042 
Trust (Credibility)1          .238 
Trust (Benevolence)1          .212 
 
Adjusted R-Square    .004     .464      .465 
F test value      .84  14.04****   8.79**** 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
**** p < .001, ** p < .05 
Note: N = 45. Directional hypotheses were tested using a one-tailed t-test. 
1 Mediating variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Mediating Role of Trust under the No Perceived Interdependence Condition 
Dependent variable: Loyalty 
 
Variables   Model 1   Model 2  Model 3 
Purchase Volume    .401**    .153       .074 
Procedural Fairness           .403**              .703*** 
Distributive Fairness        .380**   .452** 
Trust (Credibility)1            .437** 
Trust (Benevolence)1            .061 
 
Adjusted R-Square    .129        .367       .435 
F Statistic    4.99**  6.22***           5.16*** 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*** p < .01, ** p < .05 
             Note: N = 27. Directional hypotheses were tested using a one-tailed t-test. 
1 Mediating variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Moderated-Mediation Model of Hypothesized Relationships 
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